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Article
Directors’ defence of reliance
on professional advisers
under Anglo-Australian law
Wai Yee Wan1
Abstract
This paper analyses the issue of whether directors may use reliance on professional advice as a
defence to a claim for breach of duty to exercise care, skill and diligence under common law or
companies legislation in England and Australia. While England and Australia share the same
common law tradition and have similar statutory provisions on the standard of care of directors, an
English court generally regards a director as acting reasonably when he seeks advice from a
qualified and independent professional adviser in a specialist matter within his expertise. In the
absence of any conflict of interest, reliance is only unreasonable if the circumstances are so plain
and obvious that no prudent person will rely on the advice. In contrast, recent Australian cases,
particularly ASIC v Healey, ASIC v MacDonald and ASIC v Fortescue, restrict the circumstances in
which directors can rely on professional advisers, even in specialist matters. This paper argues that
the difference in approach between the two jurisdictions can be explained on two grounds. First,
the Australian cases can be distinguished from the English cases because the former are special
situations dealing with matters involving non-delegable duties of care imposed by legislation.
Second, the potential outcomes of the breach of the duty of care differ in England and Australia,
and this difference has a much deeper, substantive influence on the content of the standard of care.
Contrary to academic suggestion, it is suggested that the Australian developments may not always
be appropriate in determining the scope of the defence of reliance on professional advice in
England.
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Introduction
A consequence of the complexity of modern regulation and higher expectations on directors of
large or listed companies to monitor their companies’ affairs is an increasing reliance by directors
on professional advisers. Directors often assume that they have discharged their duty of care to the
company if they rely on the advisers in good faith, notwithstanding that their advice may have
turned out to be misguided or wrong. However, recent decisions in England and Australia show a
divergence in the approach towards the application of reliance on professional advice to a breach of
duty of care claim.
The English cases, including Re Continental Assurance Co of London (No. 4)1 and Iesini v
Westrip Holdings Ltd,2 have allowed directors to use the defence of reliance on professional advice
in claims involving breach of duty of care under common law or companies legislation3 as long as
the professional adviser is appropriately qualified, independent and his advice is rendered within
his qualification. However, notwithstanding the similarities in legal origins and the formulation of
the statutory duty of care, the Australian cases, in particular ASIC v Healey (Healey),4 appear to
take a more stringent approach than the English cases towards the invocation of the defence of
reliance on professional advice for breach of duty of care claims. In order for the directors to
successfully invoke the defence, the court inHealey held that the directors must not only assess the
competence of the professional advisers, but also possess the skills to assess, and in fact inde-
pendently assess, the advice that is given.5 Commentators have described Healey as providing a
‘wake-up’ call for directors of companies,6 and corporate law scholars have argued that English
courts are likely to apply the same approach as Healey.7
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, this paper compares and contrasts the appli-
cation of the defence of reliance on professional advice to breach of duty of care under common
law or companies legislation in England and Australia. Second, this paper explains the theoretical
and doctrinal reasons for the apparent divergence in the English and Australian case law. Third,
this paper offers normative conclusions as to how an English court may apply the defence of
reliance on professional advice in breach of duty of care claims arising from materially inaccurate
financial statements or public disclosure documents and the general management of the company.
For convenience, I characterise the directors’ reliance on the professional advisers as the defence
of reliance on professional advice, though strictly speaking it is not an independent stand-alone
defence to liability to duty of care but one which shows the director as having exercised due care.
‘Background to the development of the law on standard of care of directors’ sets out the
background to the development of law on directors’ standard of care under common law or
companies legislation in England and Australia. Under ‘Criteria for the defence of reliance on
professional advice’ I compare the application of the defence of reliance on professional advice to
breach of duty of care claims in the two jurisdictions. The following Australian cases will be
highlighted: Healey, ASIC v MacDonald (No 11) (MacDonald)8 and ASIC v Fortescue Metals
Group (Fortescue),9 both of which involve enforcement actions being brought against directors of
Australian-listed companies for the contravention of the statutory duty of care.10 I also argue that
the effect of these decisions is to impose more rigorous standards on directors because the directors
must not only assess the qualifications and competence of the professional advisers, but also
possess sufficient competent skills to assess, and in fact assess, the results of the professional
advice.
Under ‘Theoretical underpinnings for the reliance defence and reasons for the differences’ I
examine the theoretical framework and provide two reasons for the differences in the approaches
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between the two jurisdictions. First, the Australian cases can be distinguished from the English
cases because the former relate to breaches of non-delegable duties of care imposed by legislation
in special situations. Second, the outcomes of the breach of statutory duty of care are different and
it is argued that the different outcomes have deeper, substantive consequences on the content of the
standard of care.
Finally, under ‘Normative conclusions’ I address the normative issue as to whether the English
courts should follow the Australian developments. Contrary to academic suggestion,11 it is sug-
gested that the Australian development may not always be appropriate in determining the scope of
the defence of reliance on professional advice in England.
Background to the development of the law on standard of care of
directors
England
Historically, at common law, there was considerable deference to the company’s prerogative to set
its own process for information flow and delegation of authority, in the absence of grounds of
actual suspicion.12 The standard of care imposed on directors, encapsulated by Re City Equitable
Fire Insurance Co Ltd,13 was very low and undemanding, and directors were seldom held liable for
negligence.14
In 1986, two important pieces of legislation were enacted which impose a more demanding
standard on directors. First, the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 provides that the
courts may disqualify a director if, among other things, the court is satisfied that his conduct in
relation to the company makes him unfit to be involved in the management of the company, thus
raising the possibility that a director may be disqualified on the ground of incompetence.15 Second,
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides for the court to make an order for the director to
contribute to the assets of the company on an insolvent liquidation if, prior to the commencement
of the winding up, the director ‘knew or ought to have concluded’ that the company would go into
insolvent liquidation. The knowledge and conclusions are those which would be known by a
reasonably diligent person having both: (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that
director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that
director has.16 In other words, section 214 imposes both an objective element which all directors
must meet and a subjective element which raises the standard of the relevant director who
possesses the relevant skill.
In the 1990s, influenced by the statutory formulation of the standard of care set out in the
Insolvency Act 1986, the English courts began to take a more objective approach to setting the duty
of care. Beginning with Norman v Theodore Goddard17 and subsequently D’Jan of London Ltd,18
Hoffmann J held that the directors’ duty of care at common law was consistent with the tortious
duty of care at common law which was accurately encapsulated in section 214 of the Insolvency
Act 1986. Thus the objective and subjective elements of the standard of care became part of
English law.
The dual tests of standard of care were eventually codified via the enactment of the UK
Companies Act 2006 (UK Companies Act) after extensive consultation.19 Section 174 of the UK
Companies Act makes it clear that there is an objective minimum standard of conduct and that the
standard may be raised if the director has any special knowledge, skill and experience.20
Wan 73
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It is difficult to pinpoint the origins of the modern judicial approach.21 However, the outcome of
Norman v Theodore Goddard is consistent with the increasing emphasis that corporate governance
committees have placed on the monitoring role played by the boards of large listed companies in
the 1990s. In particular, the Cadbury Report,22 which was published shortly after Norman v
Theodore Goddard, emphasised the importance that non-executive directors play in performing
the monitoring role of large listed companies.23
With the marked increase in standards imposed on directors since the historical position taken in
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance, the question as to whether the defence of reliance on profes-
sional advice will protect the directors from a claim based on breach of duty of care becomes
important. The UK Companies Act does not contain a statement to the effect that directors may
rely on professional advisers. The Company Law Steering Group took the view that there was no
need to make any express provision allowing for such reliance, so long as advisers are carefully
selected and conclusions carefully scrutinised in accordance with the standard applicable to the
director.24 Thus the position as to the scope of the defence of reliance on professional advice is to
be determined by common law. The section on ‘Criteria for the defence of reliance on professional
advice’ discusses of how the defence has been applied in English case law.
Finally, section 1157 of the UK Companies Act grants power to the court to grant relief in
respect of a director’s negligence, default or breach of duty if, having regard to all the circum-
stances of the case, he ought fairly to be excused.25 This provision is relevant as a director who has
been found to be in breach of duty of care may use section 1157 to establish that he ought fairly to
be excused because he has relied on professional advice.
Australia
In Australia, the statutory duty of care of directors is found in section 180 of the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth)26 (Corporations Act). Section 180 provides that the director must exercise due care and
diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if he were a director of the corporation in the
corporation’s circumstances and, among other things, had the same responsibilities within the cor-
poration as the director. The reference to the corporation’s circumstances requires consideration of
the corporation-specific information, such as its size, business, listing status, board composition and
the distribution of work between the board and management.27 Case law has held that section 180 is
equivalent to the common law duty of the tort of negligence,28 and that it requires directors to take
reasonable steps to monitor and be reasonably informed on the company’s financial position.29 More
pertinently, as is the case in England, Australian case law has held that section 180 encapsulates both
objective and subjective tests; the director will be assessed by what a reasonable and prudent person
would do and the duty is enhanced if the director is appointed on the basis of a special skill.30
Section 189 of the Corporations Act, which does not have an equivalent in the UK Companies
Act, provides that directors can rely on information or advice from professional advisers on matters
within the professional’s expertise in certain circumstances.31 The Corporations Act also has
provisions on insolvent trading, though the regime is stricter than the UK Insolvency Act 1986, in
that the provisions impose liability on directors where there is reasonable suspicion of insol-
vency,32 with certain defences.33 However, unlike the UK,34 a director can claim the statutory
discretionary relief from liability under the Corporations Act for insolvent trading. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to discuss the differences in the approaches to insolvent or wrongful trading,35
and this paper will focus only on those situations where discretionary relief is granted on the
ground of the reliance on professional advice defence.
74 Common Law World Review 44(1)
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Criteria for the defence of reliance on professional advice
The position in England
In claims involving breach of duty of care under common law or companies legislation, the extent
to which directors may be able to rely on other directors and professionals to perform their duties is
said to be in a state of development and is ‘fact sensitive’.36 This section discusses the application
of the defence in breach of duty cases by the English courts.
No requirement of independent assessment. Under English law, in duty of care claims, a director is
normally regarded as having discharged his duty of care if he has acted on the advice provided by
the appointed professional adviser having the appropriate qualification in specialist areas. The
director is not normally expected to have the skills to assess the advice that is rendered in specialist
areas. In Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc (No 4),37 a wrongful trading case under
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the board of an insurance company was held to have acted
reasonably in taking advice from its auditors that the company was not insolvent at the relevant
time and should continue to trade. The court held that the non-executive directors and the man-
aging director (with the exception of the finance director) were expected to be intelligent laymen
who had basic accounting principles for an insurance company but not a high level of accounting
expertise such as might be possessed by a specialist in the field.38 It is important to note that at that
time the board comprised two executive and six non-executive directors, all of the eight directors
had considerable commercial experience and three of the six non-executive directors had worked
in the insurance industry. Nevertheless, the court emphasised that all of the directors, except for the
finance director, were regarded as laymen with respect to accounting issues.
Likewise, in Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd,39 Westrip entered into an agreement with Rimbal
(owned by B and W, who were also directors of Westrip) pursuant to which Westrip acquired
Rimbal shares in consideration for the allotment of redeemable shares to B and W. Rimbal had the
mineral exploration licence and the intention was for Westrip to exploit the licence. The licence
was expressed to be held on trust for Westrip. Westrip entered into a joint venture agreement with
another company to exploit the licence. Subsequently, Westrip failed to issue those redeemable
shares and B and W proceeded to rescind the agreement and have the Rimbal shares retransferred
to them. The board of Westrip obtained legal advice to the effect that B and W had the right to
rescind. Westrip accepted the rescission and entered into the settlement agreement pursuant to
which Rimbal would be substituted into the joint venture agreement.
Certain shareholders of Westrip brought a shareholders’ derivative action against the board of
Westrip, arguing that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties by failing to consider the
defences to the rescission. The court held that the board of Westrip had acted reasonably in fol-
lowing counsel’s advice in respect of its contractual rights under the agreement by accepting the
rescission.
It is not relevant that other professional advisers would have given different or better advice. In
Green vWalkling,40 in a specialist area involvingmoney laundering, the court held that if the director
seeks appropriate advice from solicitors and acts upon such advice, believing it to be correct, he will
have prima facie fulfilled his duty.41 It was held that it did not matter that the advice was wrong or
that a different solicitor would have given different (and better) advice. Similarly, in Re Stephenson
Cobbold Ltd,42 a disqualification case, the non-executive director was entitled to rely on assurances
by the company’s auditors that certain payments to the managing director were proper, when he
co-signed certain cheques, even if other auditors would not have given such assurances.
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Adviser must be independent. Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd established an additional caveat that the
professional adviser should not only be qualified but also be independent. In that case, as for the
alternative trust claim by the company brought by the shareholders in derivative action, the court
noted that the board allowed B and W, the directors with a conflict of interest, to instruct counsel,
and this undermined the weight of such reliance. The court directed the board to reconsider
Westrip’s defence to Rimbal’s claim for substitution, on the basis that there might be a strong claim
that Westrip held the licence on trust.
Reliance must not be unreasonable. Where the cases have denied the defence of reliance on pro-
fessional advice, they either involve plainly unreasonable reliance, that is, no prudent person would
have relied on such advice or there was no reliance on the adviser’s expertise at all.43
Re Bradcrown44 and Re Loquitur45 are illustrative examples of the situations where the cir-
cumstances are so obvious that no reasonable person will rely on them. In Re Bradcrown, the
finance director was found to be unfit for office and disqualified, on the ground of acting in breach
of his duty to the company in respect of a demerger of its businesses, notwithstanding the fact that
he relied on the solicitors to the transaction. In that case, the reliance was unquestioning and plainly
unreasonable as the demerger involved a transfer of assets of the company for no consideration.
In Re Loquitur, the directors of a company authorised the payment of certain dividends but
failed to provide for tax on the sale of its business, with the consequence that the company did not
actually have the profits to make such payment. In the defence to a claim brought by the company
for unlawful payment of dividend, the directors argued that they had sought the advice of the
company’s tax counsel, solicitors and accountants, and reasonably formed the view that tax was
not required to be provided for since the company could claim for rollover relief. The application
for the discretionary relief failed because the actual advice contemplated certain assumptions
relating to the transaction which the directors knew were not met and they should, but did not, refer
the transaction back to the relevant advisers for confirmatory advice.46
Where the directors have professional skills, despite the fact that section 174 provides that the
skills of the director will be taken into account and that similar dicta exist in the case law,47 the
English courts have not imposed a higher duty on the director qua director. (This is to be dis-
tinguished from the situation where higher standards will be expected of executive directors
appointed to the company under the employment contracts for their special skills.48) For example,
in Re Continental Assurance (No. 4), discussed above, the managing director and two non-
executive directors with chartered accountancy qualifications were not regarded as having more
specialist accounting knowledge than the non-executive directors in respect of an insurance
company with specialised accounting rules.49
The position in Australia—similarities and divergence with the English approach
Reliance must not be unreasonable. As is the case in England, the courts have denied the defence of
reliance on professional advice in cases where there is plainly unreasonable reliance or there was
no reliance on the adviser’s expertise at all. An example50 of unreasonable reliance was ASIC v
Australian Property Custodian Holdings Limited,51 where the directors of a company, which is a
responsible entity of a managed investment scheme (trust), obtained solicitors’ advice as to
whether they could properly approve a resolution to amend the constitution for new fees to be
payable out of the trust property to the company, thereby benefiting the company.52 The advice
was equivocal in that it provided two possible competing interpretations of the relevant provisions
76 Common Law World Review 44(1)
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of the Corporations Act as to whether such amendment is legal, without stating which the preferred
interpretation was.53 It was held that the directors acted unreasonably in relying on the advice that
they could pass such a resolution, particularly in circumstances where the directors were required
under the Corporations Act to give priority to the trust members’ interests.54
Failure to disclose the facts fully to the professional adviser may demonstrate that there is a lack
of good faith on the part of the director. ASIC v Adler55 and ASIC v Hobb56 are two Australian
examples of less than candid disclosure by the directors. In ASIC v Adler, three directors of HIH
(including A) caused a subsidiary of HIH to pay A$10 million to PEE (a trust company that was
controlled by A), to, among other things, subscribe for shares in HIH, in breach of various leg-
islative provisions relating to unlawful financial assistance for acquiring shares of a subsidiary and
to the giving of benefits to related parties without shareholder approval. In proceedings brought
against the two directors (other than A) for breach of care and diligence under section 180, they
argued unsuccessfully that they relied on the solicitors’ advice that the scheme (where the pur-
ported purchase of shares was made via a protective trust structure) was lawful; the two directors
failed to disclose a number of important facts to the solicitors, including the fact that the purchases
were made prior to any trust structure being set up.57
In ASIC v Hobbs, the individual defendants were directors of various companies which were
involved in the operation of unregistered offshore managed investment funds in Australia targeting
Australian investors and self-managed superannuation funds, in contravention of the Corporations
Act and Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001 (Cth). In enforcement proceedings
brought under section 180 of the Corporations Act, the directors argued unsuccessfully that they
relied on solicitors’ advice that registration was not required for wholly off-shore investment
schemes. The directors failed to give the actual scope of activities to the solicitors, suggesting that
they lacked good faith.58
Independent assessment of professional advice. A detailed comparison between the English and
Australian cases shows some divergence on the use of reliance on professional advice as a defence
to a breach of duty claim. Recent cases including Healey, MacDonald and Fortescue show a
marked increase in standards expected of directors. In particular, the Australian courts have
imposed on directors strict monitoring and oversight duties and have required some assessment on
the advice obtained. Thus, merely appointing (and relying on) appropriately qualified advisers to
advise on specialist matters will not generally exonerate the directors, even in the absence of
circumstances suggesting that such reliance is not prudent. The increase in the standards can be
seen first in contrasting ASIC v Maxwell59 with ASIC v Rich60 and second in contrasting Daniels v
Anderson61 with ASIC v Healey and MacDonald.
First, in ASIC vMaxwell, one of the directors was appointed for his building skills in a real estate
company, which promoted schemes for purchase and development of real estate without the
appropriate disclosure documents, thereby contravening the Corporations Act. It was held that he
was not in breach of section 180 because he could rely on the fact that lawyers and accountants were
appointed and who would be expected to ensure that the schemes were lawful. However, that aspect
of the decision was doubted in the subsequent case ofASIC v Rich. ASIC v Rich involved the alleged
failure of two executive directors to monitor the deteriorating financial position of One.Tel, which
eventually collapsed under the weight of its debts and other financial problems. Austin J held that:
It seems to me that, in light of [Vines v ASIC (2007) 62 ACSR 1], the earlier view that ‘directors are not
required to exhibit a greater degree of skill in the performance of their duties than may reasonably be
Wan 77
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expected for persons of commensurate knowledge and experience, in the relevant circumstances’
(Maxwell at [101]) is no longer correct.
Second, in Healey, it was held that there was a strict obligation on all directors (executive and
non-executive) to ensure that the provisions in the Corporations Act dealing with corporate
accounts were considered and applied in the proper manner.62 In that case, there were material
errors found in the accounts: the 2007 annual reports of Centro Properties Group (CNP) and Centro
Retail Group (CER) failed to disclose significant matters. In the case of CNP, the report failed to
disclose some A$1.5 billion of short-term liabilities as they were wrongly classified as non-current
liabilities, and failed to disclose guarantees of short-term liabilities of an associated company of
approximately US$1.75 billion that had been given after the balance sheet date. In the case of CER,
the 2007 annual reports failed to disclose some A$500 million of short-term liabilities that had
been classified as non-current. The audit committee and a major auditing firm had signed off on the
accounts. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) brought enforcement
proceedings against the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO) and the six
non-executive directors. All of the directors were held to have contravened section 180.63
Middleton J noted that the directors had not acted dishonestly but held that:
The case law indicates that there is a core, irreducible requirement of directors to be involved in the
management of the company and to take all reasonable steps to be in a position to guide and monitor.
There is a responsibility to read, understand and focus upon the contents of those reports which the law
imposes a responsibility upon each director to approve or adopt.
All directors must carefully read and understand financial statements before they form the opinions
which are to be expressed in the declaration required by s 295(4) [of the Corporations Act]. Such a
reading and understanding would require the director to consider whether the financial statements were
consistent with his or her own knowledge of the company’s financial position. This accumulated
knowledge arises from a number of responsibilities a director has in carrying out the role and function
of a director. These include the following: a director should acquire at least a rudimentary understand-
ing of the business of the corporation and become familiar with the fundamentals of the business in
which the corporation is engaged; a director should keep informed about the activities of the corpora-
tion; while not required to have a detailed awareness of day-to-day activities, a director should monitor
the corporate affairs and policies; a director should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the
corporation by a regular review and understanding of financial statements; a director, while not an
auditor, should still have a questioning mind.64
In Healey, while directors are entitled to rely on, among others, the auditor, the board audit and
risk management committees and senior management, reliance ceases to be reasonable when a
director is or should be aware of circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to question
what he was being told.65 On the facts, the errors as to classification of the debt were ‘obvious’
since the directors were, or should be, aware of accounting standards.66 A key point to note is that
Middleton J did not limit the requirement of understanding basic accounting conventions to the
particular board of Centro, which comprises very competent directors (including a chartered
accountant and chief executives of other companies).67 Instead, it was held that all directors must
have the requisite grasp of basic accounting conventions; while what is regarded as a ‘basic’ level
of depth is not defined,68 ‘basic’ knowledge would include knowledge of a change in the classi-
fication of the liabilities in question as a result of the transition to the new Australian International
78 Common Law World Review 44(1)
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Financial Reporting standards, which was overlooked by the board committees and the auditors, as
well as the disclosure of post-balance sheet events. At a practical level, however, it is difficult to
see how a non-executive director with limited accounting knowledge would be able to discharge
his duties unless he had a working knowledge of the relevant accounting standards.
In MacDonald, ASIC brought enforcement proceedings against the directors of a company
formerly known as James Hardie Industries Ltd (JHIL), a publicly listed company which was
historically a manufacturer of asbestos products. ASIC alleged that the board of directors
(including the CEO and the seven non-executive directors) breached their duty of care under
section 180 when they approved JHIL’s issuance of an announcement regarding a proposed
restructure of the company. This proposed restructure involved the transfer of the asbestos
liabilities of two of its subsidiaries to a foundation and the two subsidiaries entered into a deed of
covenant and indemnity (DOCI) which provided, among other things, that in return for JHIL
making annual payments to the two companies (which were effectively payments to the founda-
tion), the subsidiaries would not make any claim against JHIL relating to asbestos operations and
would indemnify JHIL against any claims which might be made against it in relation to asbestos
operations. There were two difficulties with the announcement on the proposed restructure; first,
the announcement stated that the foundation would be fully funded to meet the expected liabilities,
which turned out to be wholly inaccurate. The funding of the foundation was determined using
inadequate actuarial reports and the foundation was in fact massively underfunded, leaving victims
of asbestos liabilities potentially without any remedy. Second, the announcement did not disclose
the DOCI information, and the DOCI information was only published in the annual report in June
2001. The covenants entered into pursuant to the DOCI were valuable because they protected JHIL
from co-extensive liabilities as a joint tortfeasor with the two subsidiaries.
The case against the directors of JHIL was that they each breached section 180 by approving the
false and misleading announcement, and in the case of the CEO, by failing to advise the board to
disclose material information relating to the DOCI.69 Before Gzell J, JHIL was found to have
contravened the Corporations Act relating to false and misleading disclosures and non-disclosure
of material information.70 The CEO and the non-executive directors breached their duties under
section 180 in respect of approval of the false or misleading announcement. While there is no
specific reference in the Corporations Act (or the Corporations Law) that imposes a duty on each
director to assume responsibility for the disclosure announcement, Gzell J found that such a non-
delegable duty exists. Further, the CEO breached section 180 by failing to advise the board that it
was necessary to disclose the DOCI information. On appeal, the decision was reversed on technical
grounds but on further appeal to the High Court the decision of Gzell J was upheld.
In respect of the false and misleading announcement, the directors argued that they had relied
on information and advice provided by the actuarial experts and solicitors, pursuant to section
189 of the Corporations Act. The argument based on reliance on the actuarial experts failed
before the trial judge and the High Court, on the ground that the directors should have known the
misleading nature of the announcement, in light of their knowledge as to the limitations of the
actuarial reports.
The directors also failed in their argument that they had relied on the solicitors, who were
present in the boardroom when they approved the misleading announcement, to raise their doubts
as to the adequacy of funding. The directors could not prove that it was within the mandate of the
solicitors to raise these objections at the board meeting. This may come as a surprise since the
solicitors were retained to draft the announcement, and were present at the board meeting, and it
would be expected that they would raise the requisite queries if the announcement had material
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inaccuracies. However, in defence of the solicitors’ actions, on the facts, they had raised the
concerns about the reliability of the actuarial reports to the CEO and general counsel just prior to
the board meeting,71 and the CEO had assured the solicitors that the foundation was fully funded.
The CEO’s reliance on section 189 failed because there was no reliance nor was there an inde-
pendent assessment carried out, required under the provision.
In Fortescue, Fortescue, a publicly-listed Australian company, was alleged to have issued
misleading or deceptive statements to the market that it had entered into binding contracts with
Chinese state-owned enterprises for certain projects. Its CEO, F, was alleged to have breached
section 180 by procuring Fortescue to issue misleading or deceptive statements. In the first
instance,72 it was found that the statements were not misleading,73 and F was not in breach of
section 180 as he had acted reasonably by relying on Fortescue’s in-house counsel, who had
reviewed the framework agreements and would have advised F if the agreements were not binding.
On appeal to the Full Federal Court, the decision was overturned on the ground that the
statement was misleading or deceptive.74 F was in breach of section 180 for causing the company
to issue such misleading announcement and the defence of reliance on the solicitors failed because
there was no evidence that he sought or obtained the in-house legal advice until after the
announcement was issued. On appeal to the High Court, it was found that the statement was not
misleading or deceptive, with the consequence that there was no breach by F.75 However, the Full
Federal Court’s decision as to F’s liability is still good law (had the statement been misleading or
deceptive) and it is clear that the Australian appellate court expects that specific legal advice must
be sought as to the legal enforceability of framework agreements before reliance can be placed.
Thus, had Fortescue’s statement been misleading, F’s outcome would be likely to have been
similar to MacDonald, where the directors could not rely on the defence of reliance on the soli-
citors who drafted the disclosure announcement and were present in the boardroom at the time of
approval, because the directors could not show that it was within the mandate of the solicitors to
raise objections at the board meeting.
Notwithstanding the fact that Healey and MacDonald emphasise the monitoring role of the
board, and academic commentators have argued that they did not establish new principles,76 the
judgments show that the Australian courts expect that the board will be the final check in respect of
the financial statements and disclosure documents. Even if the directors are entitled to delegate the
tasks to senior officers and professional advisers, they will continue to retain responsibility (and
liability) for monitoring those tasks performed by their delegates or advisers. Monitoring in this
context requires not only that the directors assess the qualifications and competence of the advisers
in appointing them, but also that they possess sufficient competent skills to assess, and carry out the
assessment of, the results of the work of the advisers assigned to them. The assessment must also
take place in the context of what the directors know and ought to know about the company.
The raising of standards in Healey and MacDonald can be seen when the cases are contrasted
with the earlier decision of Daniels v Anderson. While the courts in Healey and MacDonald paid
lip service to following Daniels v Anderson, in reality they applied a more rigorous standard,
particularly to the non-executive directors. In Daniels v Anderson, the CEO, but not the non-
executive directors, was found to have been in breach of section 180. AWA, a company in the
import business, appointed K as its manager for foreign exchange (forex) trading. The objective of
the forex trading was to protect AWA from unfavourable currency swings and not for speculative
purposes. K, in breach of the foreign exchange trading guidelines adopted by the board, engaged in
unauthorised and speculative trading without any adequate supervision by senior management.
The financial statements showed a very large profit arising from the forex trading for 1986 but an
80 Common Law World Review 44(1)
80
 by guest on March 27, 2015clw.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
A$49 million loss for 1987. AWA’s auditors were found to be negligent because they failed,
among other things, to alert the board to the serious lapse in internal controls, particularly when the
senior management was not acting upon their advice. The auditors brought a cross-claim against
the directors for an indemnity or contribution, arguing that the directors were negligent in the
discharge of their duties; it was argued that they were aware of the large (and fluctuating) profit
shown by the financial statements for 1986 but failed to make inquiries.
The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and held that the non-executive
directors were not negligent.77 In the early months of 1987, the non-executive directors had raised
the questions at the board meetings with the senior management and auditors regarding the
fluctuating profits and had received a confirmation from the auditors that the profits were genuine
and the information given was complete. They had relied on the auditors to inform the board about
the inadequacies of the internal controls and the auditors had suggested to those directors that
everything was above board.78 Given that the auditors were specifically requested to attend the
board meetings relating to the fluctuating profits, the non-executive directors would have justi-
fiably expected that the auditors would inform the board of their earlier concerns relating to the
inadequacies of internal controls, which was previously raised with the CEO but not with the
board.
In Healey, Middleton J emphasised that in relation to approving financial statements, the
directors must probe and seek clarifications from the auditors and management if there are issues
that arise based not only on the statements and accompanying papers, but also in light of their
background knowledge of the affairs of the company. Likewise, inMacDonald it was emphasised
that the directors should have probed into the adequacy of the funding in light of what they knew
before approving the draft announcement, even though the professional advisers were present in
the board room.
In contrast, in Daniels v Anderson, the non-executive directors were found to have discharged
their duty of care because they raised questions and received confirmations from the managing
director and the auditors. However, the question still remains as to whether, by today’s standards,
the non-executive directors would be expected to take the relevant line of inquiry further or press
for confirmations, as opposed to taking the assurances of the auditors or senior management at face
value.
Theoretical underpinnings for the reliance defence and reasons for the
differences
Theoretical underpinnings
It is clear that enabling directors to rely on professional advisers and others will somewhat lessen
the standard of care imposed on directors. Are there good reasons to protect, or insulate from
liability, directors who have relied on the appropriate advisers within their expertise, in the absence
of circumstances or red flags which make such reliance unreasonable? Should directors be com-
pelled to take a more active role in independently assessing the advice obtained?
While there is a general policy that the directors should not have to suffer for the incompetence
or negligence of the professional adviser, there is a concern that directors will absolve themselves
of responsibility by appointing advisers and shifting all risk of liability to them. This section argues
that there are two possible explanations for the difference in the approaches. First, albeit a partial
explanation, Healey, MacDonald and Fortescue are cases involving breaches of duty of care
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involving non-delegable duties, which are treated more rigorously. Second, the outcome of a
breach of the statutory duty of care in these three cases is a civil penalty and the court has the power
to signal what it regards as aspirational standards without subjecting the defendant director to a
serious threat of directorial civil liability. This difference in outcome has deeper and substantive
consequences.
Reasons for the differences
Breaches of non-delegable duties of care. Healey and MacDonald are cases involving the preparation
of financial statements and public disclosure documents respectively. The Corporations Act
imposes the duty on directors to be responsible for the financial statements.79 While the Corpo-
rations Act does not specifically provide that directors are responsible for public disclosure doc-
uments, the court in MacDonald held that the legislation imposes a non-delegable duty on the
directors of JHIL to assume responsibility for the particular announcement,80 which is a very
significant announcement concerning the future strategic direction of JHIL in respect of its
asbestos liabilities.
It could be argued that the more stringent approach in Australia found in Healey and Mac-
Donald should be confined to breach of duty of care in respect of the production of financial
statements and significant public disclosure documents. They are regarded as non-delegable duties
under the Corporations Act; in other words, these are duties that the directors are specifically
responsible for and which they cannot delegate or shift the responsibility for, even in specialist
areas. They are not duties incurred in respect of general management of the company.
By contrast, in England, Re Continental Assurance Co of London (No. 4), Iesini v Westrip
Holdings Ltd and Green v Walking pertain to obtaining professional advice in the course of the
management of the company and do not involve matters that directors are specifically made
responsible for by legislation. Thus they are analogous to commercial decisions that directors make
in the course of management of the company. Courts do not second-guess commercial decisions
made by directors81 and mere errors of judgement by directors are not regarded as negligence.82
Where the directors appoint the appropriate professional advisers in the course of management and
rely on advice which they reasonably believe is purportedly within the advisers’ expertise, there is
no reason to second-guess the decision relying on such advice in the absence of any red flags or
indication that the advice is patently incorrect. Directors have to make decisions, usually under
time constraints, and the articulation of the fact that the courts do not second-guess directorial
decisions manifests recognition of these realities.
However, distinguishingHealey andMacDonald from the English cases on the ground that they
involve non-delegable duties imposed under legislation is unlikely to be a complete explanation. In
other situations involving breaches of what are strict and thus arguably non-delegable duties on the
part of directors imposed under the companies legislation, such as the capital maintenance rules,83
the English courts have been willing to exonerate a director who has relied on professional advice
under section 1157 of the UK Companies Act, if there was no dishonesty or self-dealing.84 It is not
a bar to relief under the provision even if the directors have been negligent.85 For example, in Re
Paycheck Services,86 at first instance, the director was held to have acted reasonably in following
the advice of counsel and accountants on tax planning, pursuant to which the company had dis-
tributed dividends in excess of distributable profits, in contravention of the UK Companies Act.
The reliance only became unreasonable subsequently when the director received different (and
unequivocal) advice from a Queen’s Counsel that the tax structure was unworkable. Given that
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liability for the unlawful payment of dividends is strict, reliance on counsel is arguably not relevant.
However, the English court would have been willing to apply section 727 of the UK Companies Act
1985 (now section 1157 of the UK Companies Act) to excuse the director on such reliance. In
contrast, in Healey (No. 2), discussed below, Middleton J refused to exercise the discretion to excuse
the directors under the Australian equivalent of section 1157 of the UK Companies Act.
Difference in substantive outcome of breach of duty of care.Amore persuasive reason for the difference
between the Australian and English approaches lies in the difference in the outcome of breach of
the duty of care. Healey, MacDonald and Fortescue are enforcement actions brought by ASIC
where a breach of section 180 may lead to an order of financial penalties or disqualification.87 In
England, the statutory duty of care in section 174 is intended as a restatement of the case law in
statutory form and the consequences of the breach remain civil. This section of this article argues
that the difference in the outcome would lead to deeper and substantive implications on the content
of the duties under section 180 in Australia and section 174 in England.
Healey is a civil penalty case and the consequences must be viewed from the perspective not only
of liability but also of the sanctions imposed. InHealey (No. 2), while Middleton J refused to exercise
his discretion to exonerate the directors under section 1317S or 1318 of the Corporations Act
(equivalent to section 1157 of the UK Companies Act), a relatively lenient sentence was imposed on
the directors; a fine of A$30,000 was imposed on the former CEO (with no disqualification order)
and a two-year disqualification on the former CFO. No penalties were imposed on the six non-
executive directors, though declarations of contravention were imposed. This is the regulatory
technique in Australia, where civil penalties may be imposed on directors for breach of the statutory
duty of care, and both the liability and sentencing judgments in Healey reflect the balance reached as
regards the tension between legal rules and the aspirational standards that are set for directors.88 The
use of the civil penalty allows the court to achieve the twin goals of expanding the director’s
monitoring role and, at the same time, not exposing the directors to severe liabilities if they fail to live
up to the aspirational role. In contrast, civil penalties are not available for breach of section 174 of the
Companies Act 2006 and such a breach leads to personal civil liabilities on the part of the director to
the company (subject to causation and loss). Thus caution is required in adopting the apparently
rigorous standard of care found in Healey, which is only aspirational given the lax sentencing.
The above argument is further buttressed by comparing the cases in both Australia and England
on statutory relief from civil liability (as opposed to civil penalty), which show that the courts are
willing to provide relief from civil liability where the director acts reasonably in relying on pro-
fessional advice within his expertise (without demanding further independent assessment). In
England, as outlined above, in Re Paycheck Services, the court was willing to exonerate the
director as regards his reliance on professional tax advisers, but only until he received unequivocal
Queen’s Counsel’s advice.
In Australia, two recent cases demonstrate that a director has greater success in respect of
obtaining the discretionary relief from civil liability from insolvent trading based on the reliance
defence, as compared to civil penalty proceedings. The first case is Hall v Poolman,89 where the
tax office issued a notice of assessment which was disputed by the company. The directors
engaged restructuring professionals to act on their behalf. It was found that the company was
insolvent after the issuance of the notice of assessment, but the court regarded that the directors
acted reasonably in not ceasing to trade immediately. The chairman of the board was excused
from liability from the insolvent trading until it became clear that the negotiations could not be
resolved quickly.
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The second case isMcLellan v Carroll,90 where the defendant was a director of a company that
conducted a business processing and wholesaling raw timber. The company appointed a new
accountant who knew the timber mill industry well and told the director on a number of occasions
that he did not believe the company was insolvent. In proceedings brought against the director for
insolvent trading, he was granted discretionary relief from liability because it was reasonable for
the defendant to rely on what the accountant told him, in view of the new accountant’s qualifi-
cations and experience.
Normative conclusions
This paper demonstrates that despite apparent similarities in the statutory framework on directors’
standard of care in England and Australia, there are significant differences in the development in
the case law on the use of professional advice as a defence to a breach of duty of care claim.
The recent Australian cases have signalled the importance of certain duties to directors by
designating such duties as non-delegable and restricting the ability of directors to rely on pro-
fessional advisers, even in specialist areas. The question is whether this approach on the defence of
reliance on professional advice should be applied in the same manner in England. I will consider
the following three situations where the defence of reliance on professional advice to a breach of
duty of care claim may arise:
 where the directors rely on professional advice in the general course of management of the
company;
 where the directors rely on professional advice in the preparation of financial statements;
and
 where the directors rely on professional advice in the preparation of public disclosures to the
securities markets.
First, I consider the situation where directors are acting on professional advice in discharging
their general duty of management of the company (as opposed to satisfying specific legislative
requirements). This situation can be distinguished from the recent Australian cases (Healey,
MacDonald and Fortescue) which involve specific duties imposed expressly or impliedly on the
directors under the companies legislation. Under existing English law,91 if directors have sought
and relied on the advice of independent professional advisers within their expertise, they should be
allowed to avail themselves of the reliance defence unless there are red flags that exist which
demonstrate that reliance is plainly unreasonable. If the directors are non-executive directors, they
would not ordinarily be held to higher standards in their capacity qua directors even if they possess
special skills. To require that the directors, particularly non-executive directors, independently
assess the advice that is given will be too onerous an obligation, and one which the English courts
have rightly not imposed. That is not to say that directors will be let off lightly once they have
instructed professional advisers. If the directors in Continental Assurance Co Ltd had asked no
questions at all at the board meeting that was held to discuss the solvency of the insurance company
and blindly accepted the advice of the auditors, the outcome is likely to have been different.
The second situation concerns financial statements that are materially misleading or otherwise
fail to conform to the Financial Reporting Standards, and which are not within the safe harbour in
respect of directors’ reports within section 463 of the UK Companies Act.92 Similar to Australia,
directors of UK companies are under a specific responsibility to ensure that the financial
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statements give a ‘true and fair view’ of the state of affairs of the company under section 393 of
the UK Companies Act. Would an English court take a similar approach to that in Healey, as
argued by an academic commentator in respect of an action founded on breach of duty of care
owed to the company?93
It is submitted that the Australian approach towards the use of professional advice as a defence
to liability in the context of financial statements is not appropriate for England. As argued under
‘Theoretical underpinnings for the reliance defence and reasons for the differences’ above, even if
accepting that the preparation of financial statements is a non-delegable duty, Healey concerns
enforcement action by the securities regulator and the consequence of a breach of the statutory duty
of care under section 180 is one of civil penalty or disqualification. Through the use of civil
penalties, the court is able to induce directors to play a more active role in the oversight of the
preparation of financial statements, and yet not subject the directors to potential severe liabilities if
such aspirational conduct is not fulfilled. In England, a finding of breach of duty of care under
section 174 of the UK Companies Act will result in the director being liable to potentially sig-
nificant damages to the company, subject only to causation and remoteness.
The court may exercise its discretion to grant relief under section 1157 of the UK Companies
Act, which may mitigate some of the difficulties. Re Paycheck has shown that the English courts
are ready to regard a director as acting reasonably under section 1157 if he has relied on profes-
sional advice (without independent assessment) and the circumstances do not raise any red flag
which would render such reliance imprudent. However, it should be noted that the exercise of
judicial discretion under section 1157 could lead to great uncertainty to directors.
Could it be argued that reliance on professional advice is a process in which the board reaches
its decision and thus should more readily be the subject of judicial review? This argument derives
from the corporate scholars’ claim that there is a distinction between the substance of the decision
of the board and its process in reaching the decision; the process should be more readily subject to
judicial review. While the court should not determine whether the decision that is entered into was
a sound one based on the information then available, the court is in a position to review the
decision-making process in determining whether the directors have taken sufficient steps to
independently assess the advice provided so as to meet their duty of care.94
Against this view, however, the fact that courts may undertake an analysis as to the process of
decision-making itself, including determining whether the reliance on the particular professional
advice by the director is appropriate, does not necessarily indicate that the court should substitute
its views on what the directors should have done beyond selection of the appropriate advisers,
believing that advice is within the advisers’ expertise and understanding the basis upon which the
advice is given.95
The third situation concerns situations where listed issuers are liable to third parties for making
false or misleading disclosures or omissions to the securities markets. If an issuer is liable to third
parties for damages in respect of such disclosures or omissions and brings an action against the
director to recover these damages, could the director use the defence of reliance on professional
advice to avoid liability to the company for breach of his duty of care?96 While this situation is not
likely to be common in the UK as UK securities legislation has restricted claims that may be
brought by third parties against the issuers,97 the question remains as to whether non-executive
directors are able to use reliance on professional advice as a defence in a claim for breach of
duty of care to the company.98 The approach inMacDonald is to determine whether the release of
material corporate disclosures is regarded as a non-delegable duty imposed on the directors to
satisfy the legislative requirement.99 If it is characterised as a non-delegable duty, the courts would
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be slow in allowing the defence of reliance on counsel to succeed unless the director has also
independently assessed the advice that is given. In MacDonald, Gzell J held that the board
was under a non-delegable duty because the particular announcement was very material to the
company as it deals with the strategic direction of the company. In other less material and routine
announcements, the board will not be expected to scrutinise the announcement as closely.
The line between delegable and non-delegable duties imposed to satisfy the legislative
requirement is difficult to draw. However, it is submitted that an English court should take a
cautious approach in allowing the directors to rely on professional advice, particularly legal advice,
in breach of duty involving disclosure matters. In this respect, there are good reasons why public
disclosures should be treated differently from financial statements.
UnlikeHealey, which raises questions on the application of the relevant accounting standards and
should fall squarely within the purview of the auditors as specialist matters, disclosure issues do not
usually present themselves as solely questions of law.Fortescue is an exception since it raises the issue
of whether the framework agreements are legally enforceable. Instead, disclosure issues often present
as issues of fact or issues of mixed fact and law. For example, inMacDonald, both issues of fact and
mixed fact and law were present. Whether the announcement on the restructuring was materially
accurate in describing the foundation as fully funded is a question of fact. Whether the DOCI infor-
mation should be disclosed in the announcement as being material to the restructuring of JHIL is a
question ofmixed fact and law.Both issueswill require judgment on themateriality of the information
at hand andhow the information is to be presented. Thedirectorswill have to forma judgement onboth
matters and it iswithin their competence to do so. If reliance onprofessional advice can easily be raised
as a defence to the directors for a claim based on breach of duty, it may perversely encourage the
directors to take a passive role and shift the responsibility to conduct an investigationof the accuracyof
the statements to the professional advisers, particularly the legal advisers.
In addition, in breach of duty of care involving disclosure issues, the scope and ambit of the advice
given is very important. An English court is likely to require a director raising the defence of reliance
on professional advice to prove that it was within the scope of the mandate of the adviser to advise on
the matters under contention. As an illustrative example, it is not likely to be sufficient for the
director to rely on the fact that the legal adviser was appointed by the issuer to draft or advise on the
announcement, a point which was raised (and rejected) by the courts in MacDonald and Fortescue.
It must be shown that it is within the scope of work for the legal adviser to advise specifically on the
issues (whether they are issues of law, fact or mixed fact and law) which the directors have relied on.
In conclusion, the issue of reliance on professional advice is of great concern to directors since
the complexity of modern regulation requires boards to consult professional advisers and they
often assume that they have discharged their duty of care if they rely on advisers in good faith.
Non-executive directors are particularly concerned because they tend to rely on management and
external professional advisers and they are not completely insulated from negligence liability, even
with director and officer (D&O) insurance.100 There is no question that the trend in the UK and
Australia, as well as globally, has seen an increase in the expectations placed on the directors to
take their monitoring roles seriously. The recent Australian cases represent an important contri-
bution to the jurisprudence on the expectations placed on directors, particularly those of publicly
listed companies, and this paper argues that care must be taken in determining whether a more
rigorous approach towards directors’ liabilities is appropriate in England. Ultimately, the challenge
in regulating directors’ liabilities for breach of duty of care lies in putting in place sufficient
incentives for boards to take their monitoring functions seriously, but not at the expense of
spending disproportionate amounts of time, effort and money in achieving those goals.
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were legally permissible under the Corporations Act but the court held that the directors had to consider
not only whether the payments were legal but the wider interests to the company and the fact that there
was a conflict of interest). See also ASIC v Citrofresh International (No. 2) [2010] FCA 27 (a case of
misleading disclosure by the company as to the effectiveness of a particular medical product and the
director was not entitled to rely on advisers advising on corporate governance or public relations and
who did not have any technical or scientific expertise).
51. [2013] FCA 1342.
52. The provision that is alleged to have been breached is s. 601FD(1)(b) of the Corporations Act; while the
court held that the duty of care under s. 601FD(1)(b) and s. 180(1) correspond, the standard of care under
s. 601FD(1)(b) will often be ‘higher’ and the case is instructive as to what amounts to unreasonable
reliance.
53. Above n. 51 at [261]–[268] and [312]–[322].
54. Ibid. at [563].
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55. Above n. 28; appeal dismissed [2003] NSWCA 131.
56. [2012] NSWSC 1276.
57. Above n. 28 at [307].
58. Above n. 56 at [2473]–[2475].
59. Above n. 28.
60. Above n. 27 at [7207].
61. Above n. 28.
62. The director’s obligation under s. 344 of the Corporations Act is to ‘take all reasonable steps’ to comply,
or secure compliance, with Part 2 M.3 (which deals with financial reports, directors’ reports, audit,
reporting to members and lodgement with ASIC). They are under the same duty with respect to the
financial records which the entity must keep under Part 2 M.2. If they fail to take all reasonable steps
to comply or secure compliance, they contravene the Corporations Act.
63. The directors were also held to have contravened the Corporations Act, s 344 and s. 601FD(1)(b) (which
mirrors s. 180 as regards responsible entities of registered schemes, of which there were several in CNP
and CER corporate groups).
64. Above n. 4 at [16]–[17].
65. Section 189, the statutory provision on reliance, was not cited in the judgment.
66. Above n. 4 at [569] and [579]. Cf Golding (2012) (arguing that the case should have been decided on the
ground that there were two significant red flags in the case actually known to the directors, the first being
the debt maturity profile and the second being the fact that the note to the accounts was directly incon-
sistent with the debt maturity profile).
67. Above n. 4 at [421]–[433].
68. Above n. 4 at [288], holding that the directors were not expected to have a working knowledge of all of
the accounting standards or even a working knowledge of AASB 101 (presentation of financial state-
ments) or AASB 110 (events after reporting period).
69. Enforcement actions were also brought against other officers involved in the management, including its
chief financial officer and general counsel, under s. 180 of the Corporations Act.
70. The relevant provisions were s. 1001A(2) of the Corporations Act read with listing rule 3.1 (in
respect of failure to disclose the DOCI information), s. 995 of the Corporations Act (engaging
in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or was likely to mislead or deceive) and s. 999 of the
Corporations Act (making false or misleading statements). This kind of enforcement action has
been described as the ‘stepping stone’ approach by Herzberg and Anderson (2012). ASIC first
establishes an action against the company for contravention of the Corporations Act, and if suc-
cessful, ASIC brings a further action against the directors for contravention of the statutory duty
of care by exposing the company to the risk of criminal prosecution, civil liability or significant
reputational damage.
71. [2012] 12 HCA 17 at [281]–[282].
72. Above n. 9.
73. The court construed the statements to be only to the effect that the company was of the opinion that it
had the binding contracts and that the opinion was honestly held, so there was no breach.
74. It was held that the focus should be what was conveyed to the intended audience, and since Fortescue
had announced that it had binding construction contracts, and had not disclosed that the contracts were
merely ‘framework agreements’ and not actual construction contracts, the statements were misleading.
75. The High Court held that the announcement only conveyed to Fortescue’s investors a statement of what
Fortescue had done and intended would happen in the future. There was no further message to an ‘ordi-
nary or reasonable’ investor about whether the contracts were open to legal challenge in Australia, what
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the effect of the contracts was, should the parties later disagree about performance, or the ultimate enfor-
ceability of the contracts.
76. See Hill (2012). See also Lowry (2012); Solaiman (2013); Hargovan (2009).
77. At first instance, Rogers J held that reliance on others is only unreasonable if the circumstances are so
plain, manifest and simply appreciated that no one with any degree of prudence would rely on the advice
that is given. However, the Court of Appeal decision explicitly rejected this view.
78. See Daniels v Anderson, n. 28 above at 670.
79. Corporations Act, s. 344 requires a director ‘to comply with, or to secure compliance with, Part 2 M.2 or
2 M.3’. Part 2 M.2 of the Corporations Act relates to financial records, which the corporation is obliged
to keep. Part 2 M.3 deals with financial reports, including the annual directors’ report and audit.
80. See n. 70 and accompanying text above.
81. SeeHoward Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 at 832 (‘There is no appeal on merits from
management decisions to courts of law; nor will courts assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over
decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at’). See also Fisher v Cadman [2006] 1
BCLC 499 at [95] and F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) v Barthelemy [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch)
at [254] (in the context of unfair prejudice petitions, it was emphasised that the courts will not second-
guess management decisions). This is also described as the business judgment doctrine. The Law Com-
mission and Scottish Law Commission (1999: 53) recommended not to introduce the statutory defence
of the business judgment rule on the grounds that it was not necessary (since the courts already do not
second-guess commercial decisions) and that it would be too difficult to formulate such a principle with-
out making it too narrow or rigid.
82. Such as Roberts v Frohlich [2011] 2 BCLC 625 at [108].
83. It is not clear whether liability of the director to the company is strict or otherwise. SeeHolland v HMRC
[2010] UKSC 51. (Lord Hope held that there were two lines of authorities; in the first line of authorities,
the directors are strictly liable, subject to the possibility of statutory relief under s. 1157 of the Compa-
nies Act 2006 if he has acted honestly and reasonably and the court decides that he ought fairly to be
excused. In the second line of authorities, the director is only liable if he knew or ought to have known
of the misapplication. Even though it was unnecessary to express a concluded view on this issue, Lord
Hope preferred the strict liability approach.)
84. For examples of dishonesty and self-dealing which defeat relief under s. 1157, see Bairstow and Others,
n. 25 above; Cooks v Green [2009] BCC 204; and Re In A Flap Envelope, above n. 25.
85. See Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 566 at [1128]; Re D’Jan of London Ltd,
above n. 18.
86. [2008] EWHC 2200 (Ch); reversed on other grounds in Holland v HMRC [2009] EWCA Civ 625;
[2010] UKSC 51.
87. See above n. 26.
88. See Hill (2012).
89. [2007] NSWSC 1330.
90. (2009) 76 ACSR 67.
91. See the discussion above on Re Continental Assurance (No. 4), above n. 49 and accompanying text.
92. UK Companies Act 2006, s. 463 provides for a safe harbour in that the directors are only liable to the
company if they knew or are reckless as to whether the statement was false or misleading or knew the
omission to be dishonest in respect of the directors’ report and directors’ remuneration report.
93. For example Lowry (2012).
94. See Parkinson (1993: 112) (rebutting the argument that directors should be sole arbiters as to the appro-
priateness of their working methods and shareholders would be unwise to trust the directors to do the right
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thing if left alone). See also Worthington (1997: ch. 11) (arguing that the courts examine the adequacy of
the information base and the decision-making strategy itself, and not the substantive merits of the decision
itself, drawing the analogy with the policy/operational distinction found in administrative law).
95. Cf Healey, above n. 4 at [182]: ‘The determination of what constitutes due care and skill in any partic-
ular field of endeavour, and the assessment of whether it has been breached in a particular case, does not
occur in a vacuum. A court assessing those questions, whether they arise in the context of directors’
standards of due care and diligence under s. 180 of the Act, or in the context of negligence by a medical
professional, typically receives evidence from others engaged in that field of endeavour. For instance,
acceptable practice is relevant in determining the standard of care, but not decisive.’
96. The issuer may take out an action against the director or alternatively there may be a derivative action
against the errant director under Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. Whether the director is subject to
criminal sanctions or civil penalties is outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion on criminal and
quasi-criminal enforcement, see Gullifer and Payne (2011: [10.4.2]).
97. An issuer whose securities are listed on a regulated market (defined to include the London Stock
Exchange and AIM) is civilly liable to third parties who have relied on the false or misleading state-
ments or omissions under s. 90A of the Financial Markets and Services Act 2000, read with Schedule
10A, only if, among other things, the relevant person discharging managerial responsibility within the
issuer knew or is reckless as to the accuracy of the statement or knew the omission to be a dishonest
concealment of a material fact. While the issuer should not be subject to any liability to a third party
under the safe harbour set out in s. 90A, the issuer will be liable if it has assumed responsibility to a
particular person for a particular purpose as to the accuracy of the statement or completeness of the
information: see Schedule 10A, para. 7(3).
98. This situation has arisen in the US. For example, in connection with Bank of America’s acquisition of
Merrill Lynch in late 2008, Bank of America (BOA) allegedly committed material non-disclosures to
BOA’s shareholders by failing to state the true state of its knowledge of the financial state of affairs
of Merrill Lynch prior to obtaining the approval of BOA’s shareholders; the financial state of Merrill
Lynch was worse than the market had anticipated. BOA and its directors argued that they had acted
on legal advice of BOA’s lawyers, who allegedly advised that the specific disclosures were not required:
see Securities and Exchange Commission v Bank of America Corporation 2010 US Dist. LEXIS 15460,
22 February 2010.
99. The Financial and Services Markets Act 2000 does not expressly impose such a duty on the director to
be responsible for the issuer’s corporate disclosures.
100. While non-executive directors may potentially rely on D&O insurance for losses arising from culpable
acts or omissions committed in the insured’s capacity as a director, such cover may not be available if
the company is bringing the action against the director and the policy excludes insured versus insured
claims. Further, the UK Companies Act 2006 restricts the availability of indemnity; for example,
exemptions provided by the company of directors from liability are void (Companies Act 2006, s.
232(1)). Subject to certain exceptions, an indemnity in favour of the director by the company is void
if it relates to a liability incurred by him (as director) in connection with his negligence or default see
Companies Act, s. 234(2).
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